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The purpose of this thesis is to identify and evaluate
the impact of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) on
the supplemental appropriation process. The main thrust of
the thesis will be to determine whether the changes brought
about by the passage of the BEA have had any noticeable
impact upon spending controls within supplemental
appropriation legislation. It will also make an assessment
in the changes in relative power between the legislative and
executive branches with respect to supplemental
appropriations. The pattern of requests for and the
enactment of supplemental appropriation bills following
passage of the BEA will be examined to identify the major
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This thesis is a study of the effect of the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) on spending control exercised
in supplemental appropriation legislation. In order to
identify and assess this effect, analysis of the
supplemental appropriation process both before and after the
enactment of the BEA must be conducted. This paper will
analyze three separate areas, culminating in a comparison of
pre-BEA data to post-BEA data, drawing inferences from this
comparison and, finally, reaching conclusions about the
impact of the BEA on supplemental appropriation spending
control.
The first area that the thesis will address is the
supplemental appropriation process prior to the enactment of
the BEA. A definition of the term "supplemental
appropriation" will be presented, as will the purposes of
supplemental appropriations. The supplemental appropriation
process will then be contrasted with the normal budget
process and an analysis of the supplemental appropriation
spending that occurred during the period 1981-1989 will be
used to provide a baseline for measuring spending control in
supplemental appropriation legislation.
The second area that will be addressed is the
supplemental appropriation process following the enactment
of the BEA. A chapter of the thesis will be devoted to
presenting the provisions within the BEA that address
supplemental appropriations. These provisions will then be
contrasted with the manner in which supplemental
appropriation legislation was handled prior to the enactment
of the BEA. Each supplemental appropriation bill enacted
during FY 1991 and one bill initiated for FY 1991 but
delayed until FY 1992 will be analyzed in detail. For each
bill, its chronology will be outlined, its significant
political debate will be highlighted and most importantly,
the differences between the presidential request and the
final appropriation bill will be explained. This analysis
will provide insight into the political dynamics of
supplemental appropriation legislation in the BEA era.
Conclusions from these first two topics will then be
used to support the third section of the thesis. This
section will identify and assess the future implications of
the BEA provisions for supplemental appropriations for the
Department of Defense. To accomplish this, specific
Department of Defense supplemental appropriations from the
period of the study will be examined. Further, in this
third section, the thesis will discuss the individual
supplemental bills in an effort to reach some conclusions.
These conclusions will be presented in a concise manner
enabling the reader to quickly and easily comprehend the
important aspects of the research. Recommendations for
future research will also be made in this section.
This analysis is based upon evidence drawn from 46
articles from Congressional Quarterly, eleven issues of the
Department of the Navy's Budget Digest, eight publications
issued by the Congressional Research Service, seven
publications of the Office of Management and Budget, seven
articles from National Journal, six letters from
Congressional or Administration leaders, five Congressional
Budget Office publications, five public laws, five
unpublished data tables or reports, four congressional
testimony excerpts, one speech transcript and sixteen other
published sources.
H. PRE-BEA SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
"Congress relies on supplemental appropriations to fund
programs and activities that are too 'urgent' to await next
year's budget." [Ref 1] One reason that urgent needs arise
is because executive branch budget reguests are developed
and submitted so far in advance of the start of the fiscal
year that they may become inaccurate by the time the fiscal
arrives. This is particularly evident in programs that are
sensitive to changes in the national economy, such as
unemployment compensation, where predictive models are often
guite volatile. [Ref 2] Further, the problems associated
with meeting all of the reguirements associated with federal
budgets that approach the $1.5 trillion range, while
remaining within the framework of the federal budget
process, give rise to additional reasons for supplemental
appropriation legislation.
Since the early 1950 's, supplemental appropriations have
covered funds used for "new and unanticipated needs" as well
as those used to cover "agencies that used their funds at
too rapid a rate, creating either an actual overobligation
(an obligation in excess of available budget authority) or
an anticipated overobligation." [Ref 1] An appropriation
passed in 1985 to provide funds for urgent support of
African famine relief is an example of a supplemental
appropriation for "new and unanticipated needs." The
African famine was neither anticipated nor provided for by
the original 1985 budget.
On the other hand, supplemental appropriations providing
additional funds for the food stamp program passed in the
early 1980's are an example of funding for a program whose
needs had been anticipated by budget planners. Funds for
this program were depleted early by unexpected economic
conditions, thus resulting in an anticipated overobligation.
A. THE BASELINE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL
APPROPRIATIONS
To assess the impact of the BEA on spending control
within the supplemental appropriation process, a basis for
comparison of legislation before and after the enactment of
the BEA must first be developed. The baseline period for
comparison purposes will be the period from 1981 to 1989.
An average ratio for this period will be computed consisting
of the supplemental appropriation amounts enacted by
Congress divided by the supplemental appropriations
reguested by the President. Reguested and enacted
supplemental appropriations for this period are summarized
in TABLE 1 below: [Ref 3]
TABLE 1. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUESTED AND ENACTED,
1981-1989 (in millions of dollars of budget









































Total 96,902 98, 628 1,726
From the figures found in TABLE 1, the baseline ratio
for the period 1981-1989 can be calculated to be 1.018. In
other words, for every dollar of supplemental appropriations
requested by the President during the 1980' s, approximately
$1.02 was appropriated by Congress. As can be seen from
TABLE 1, these figures varied widely from year to year, with
1 The term "budget authority net of rescissions" is
defined as that additional budget authority provided for by
supplemental bills minus the amount of budget authority
rescinded. The data used in the above table excludes
rescission requests not considered by the Congress. Some
rescissions requested by the President are not included as
they are similar to those requested, but not enacted, in
previous years or were requested during the regular
appropriation cycle for that year and had yet to be acted
upon. [Ref 3]
Congress actually appropriating less than that requested by
the President on four separate occasions.
In terms of the individual spending items requested by
the President during this period, the number of times that
supplemental appropriations enacted equalled the President's
request totaled 1163. The number of times that they
exceeded the request totaled 761. On 510 occasions the
enactment was below the administration's request. In dollar
amounts before rescissions, total enacted amounts below
requests were $8.6 billion, while those above the requested
amount were $25 billion. [Ref 3]
B. SPENDING CONTROL AND THE BASELINE
These calculations suggest that supplemental
appropriation legislation during the period preceding the
BEA was generally governed by a considerable amount of
political give and take. About half of the individual items
requested by the President (48 percent) were agreed to by
Congress at the requested level. When not agreed to at the
requested level, more often than not, Congress appropriated
above the request.
In dollar terms, these additional amounts exceeded the
amounts denied the President by a ratio of about three to
one. This would indicate that supplemental appropriation
requests were used as a vehicle by Congress to increase
spending above previously agreed upon budget targets.
Historically, supplemental appropriation bills "have
received less scrutiny than the budget for the upcoming
fiscal year," thus providing an attractive opportunity for
passage of pet projects. [Ref 3] Metaphorically, Pat
Towell says, "supplemental appropriations bills loom like
sequoias in a forest of legislative Christmas trees that
droop with ornaments to meet particular constituents'
needs." [Ref 4]
It should be noted that the nature of supplemental
appropriations during the 1980' s varied from year to year.
For example, while most military pay raises during the
1980 's were funded by regular appropriation bills, on
occasion, supplemental appropriations were used for this
purpose. [Ref 3] Because of the changing nature of
supplemental appropriation legislation, the use of the 2
percent figure for enacted above requested supplemental
appropriations would not be an effective baseline when
comparing specific types of supplemental appropriations such
as defense or natural disaster expenditures.
Further, the figures used above to provide the baseline
lack a certain amount of precision due to the scorekeeping
changes that took place in the Congressional Budget Office
during the period 1981-1989. [Ref 3] However, the figures
do indicate a long term condition where enacted supplemental
appropriations exceeded those requested by about 2 percent.
Thus, for purposes of this study, the ratio of enacted
8
supplemental appropriations to requested supplemental
appropriations that will serve as a baseline for comparison
with the post-BEA supplemental appropriations will be 1.02.
m. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION PROVISIONS
OF THE BEA OF 1990
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990,
(Public Law 101-508) , was signed into law by President Bush
on November 5, 1990. The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) is
the term given to Title XIII of this law. The BEA provides
special procedures to ensure that the full savings of the
OBRA of 1990 are achieved. [Ref 5] The BEA makes
significant changes to the procedures by which the executive
and legislative branches enact appropriation spending. The
budget focus under the BEA shifts from the fixed deficit
targets that were a part of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, more commonly known
as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, to limits on discretionary
appropriations and the reguirement that changes in revenue
and entitlement spending be revenue neutral. [Ref 6]
Among the changes brought about by the BEA are two
changes affecting supplemental appropriation legislation.
The first of these is a requirement that supplemental
appropriations must be designated as "emergency"
appropriations by both the President and Congress. The
second change distinguishes between unspecified "emergency"
funding and funding for Operation Desert Shield and any




Costs for the Gulf War are considered by the BEA to
be emergency requirements without any further action.
However, the "emergency" requirements of the BEA apply to
all other supplemental legislation. [Ref 7]
Another change brought about by the BEA was the
establishment of spending caps on each of the three
discretionary spending accounts - domestic, defense and
international. The BEA exempts emergency appropriations
from the spending caps by adjusting the caps to accommodate
the appropriations:
If, for fiscal year 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, or 1995,
appropriations for discretionary accounts are enacted that
the President designates as emergency requirements and the
Congress so designates in statute, the adjustment shall be
the total of such appropriations in discretionary accounts
designated as emergency requirements and the outlays
flowing in all years from such appropriations. [Ref 8]
Implicit in this wording is the fact that supplemental
appropriations not so designated would have to be funded
from within the caps placed on discretionary spending by the
BEA. Further, since Congress was almost certain to fill
each discretionary account to the limit of the cap for
regular, non-emergency needs, one of three events must
occur. First, supplemental appropriations not designated as
"emergency" will go unfunded. Second, regular or non-
emergency appropriations would be cut to make room for
emergency spending that failed to achieve official
designation as such. Or third, a mini-sequester would be
11
enforced to reduce discretionary spending to the BEA cap
level.
A mini-sequester is an innovation of the BEA that
enables OMB to aim spending cuts at a particular spending
category - international, domestic or defense. Under Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, the only tool that OMB had was a general
sequester that cut indiscriminately across broad portions of
the budget when the fiscal year began in October. The mini-
sequester is small enough to be believable and targets the
particular spending category that exceeded its spending cap
without unfairly penalizing other programs.
The BEA gives OMB two types of sequesters that it can
use against supplementals . The "within session" sequester
affects supplementals enacted before July 1, and imposes an
immediate spending cut, while the "look back" sequester
affects supplementals enacted after June 30, and reduces the
following year's regular appropriations. [Ref 9]
But the BEA does not provide an unambiguous definition
of the term "emergency." The President and the Congress
must agree that the "emergency" exists and it must be so
designated by Congress in statute. When this agreement is
reached regarding an entire supplemental appropriation bill,
there is no confusion. However, a broad interpretation of
the BEA could result in part of an appropriation, or even a
specified amount within an individual account, being
designated as "emergency." [Ref 10]
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In practice, Congress has used both approaches.
Occasionally, Congress has used the broad interpretation by
including emergency designation statements in individual
paragraphs of the legislation. This occurred in P.L. 102-
266, Further Continuing Appropriations Act (Foreign
Operations), Fiscal Year 1992. Congress made $143 million
of a $943 million appropriation for disaster relief funds to
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) "available
only after submission to the Congress of a formal budget
request designating the $143 million as an emergency." [Ref
11]
More often, however, Congress has included a blanket
designation that covers various accounts. For example,
Public Law 102-27, Dire Emergency Supplemental for
Consequences of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Food
Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans
Compensation and Pensions, and Other Urgent Needs Act of
1991, states that "All funds provided under this title are
hereby designated to be 'emergency requirements' for all
purposes of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as amended." [Ref 12]
In a twist on the broad interpretation, Congress has, on
at least one occasion, designated a particular account as
"emergency," but made availability of the funds contingent
upon subsequent action by the President. This occurred in a
section of Public Law 102-229, Dire Emergency Supplemental
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Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1992, where Federal
Emergency Management Administration funds were involved. An
appropriation of $943 million for disaster relief was made
available until expended, of which $143 million was to be
"available only after submission to Congress of a federal
budget reguest by the President designating the $143,000,000
as an emergency." [Ref 11]
The rules of the BEA state that the President must
designate the emergency and that Congress must agree. It is
not clear from the BEA what should happen if Congress
designates certain appropriations as "emergency" on its own
and takes the position that by signing the Bill, the
President agrees. [Ref 9] These, and many other guestions
would be addressed and answered in the months that followed
the passage of the BEA.
As a result of the BEA, both the Congress and the
President have the ability to, in effect, veto legislation
that is not thought to be an "emergency". Congress can
negate Presidential reguests for emergency spending by
refusing to designate them as "emergencies" in statute.
Similarly, the President can refuse supplemental
appropriations added by Congress to his reguest and
submitted for his signature by withholding his "emergency"
designation from the portion to which he objects.
Congress, however, has always enjoyed the authority to
ignore individual items in the President's supplemental
14
appropriation requests. In other words, the BEA does not
give Congress any new authority in this area. The
President, on the other hand, is given a new ability to
"pick and choose his emergencies from the bill's provisions,
thus giving him what critics said would be a line item
veto." [Ref 13]
This contention would later be borne out in one of the
1991 supplemental appropriation processes:
In a rifle shot attack that would have been virtually
impossible a year ago, the administration's Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) killed three emergency funding
requests for less than $3 million each by Commerce
Department agencies. The money had been included in a
House passed version of the 1991 Dire Emergency
supplemental spending bill. OMB did it by threatening to
levy an across the board spending cut, or mini-sequester,
against other domestic discretionary spending programs if
Congress tried to count the Commerce Department money as
emergency spending, exempt from budget limits. Cowed,
Congress backed down. [Ref 9]
Senator Patrick Leahy, D-Vt. , concluded that "OMB has by
the stroke of a pen put in a line item veto." [Ref 9] To
which one White House Official commented, "It's a whole new
ball game." [Ref 9]
Yet despite the new provisions instituted by the BEA to
control supplemental appropriation spending, the "emergency"
designation might allow the White House and Congress to
circumvent the spending limits that were enacted as a part
of the BEA. [Ref 14] A significant concern of many budget
deficit watchers was expressed by Carol G. Cox, President of
the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget: "A likely
15
outcome might be that each side agrees to accept the other's
emergency spending in order to get what it wants." [Ref 13]
Clearly, as BEA requirements become more challenging,
increased use of the "emergency appropriations" safety valve
may be encountered.
The next four chapters of this study will focus on the
individual supplemental appropriation bills enacted in 1991.
An analysis of these four bills will be used to determine
whether or not the BEA resulted in an increased level of
supplemental appropriation spending control.
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IV. FY 1991 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION NUMBER 1:
THE "DIRE EMERGENCY" SUPPLEMENTAL
The first supplemental appropriation passed under the
BEA's new rules governing supplemental appropriations was
the "Dire Emergency" spending bill (Public Law 102-27) . It
was referred to as a dire emergency supplemental bill as a
result of an agreement at the 1987 budget summit that
supplemental appropriation bills would only be used "in the
case of dire emergencies." By CBO scoring, it consisted of
$5.45 billion in appropriations, $1.7 billion in "emergency"
funds and $3.75 billion in "non-emergency" funds [Ref 15]
designed to pay for the "indirect costs of the Persian Gulf
War and other matters that Congress felt could not wait for
the 1992 appropriations cycle." [Ref 16]
A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
On February 21, 1991, the President submitted to
Congress his request for supplemental appropriations for
actions related to the Persian Gulf War. The request was
for $2.85 billion, of which $89.75 million was requested as
"emergency" funding and $2.76 billion was requested as "non-
emergency" funding. The president designated the following
non-defense items as "emergency": the State Department and
related agencies for the Voice of America and evacuation of
17
employees, security, travel, and communications; various law
enforcement agencies to counter terrorism; and the Panama
Canal Commission for increased traffic through the canal
zone. [Ref 12]
On March 7, 1991, the House of Representatives approved
HR 1281, the "Dire Emergency" supplemental bill by a vote of
365-43. This bill was the House's response to the
President's request for funds for actions related to the
Persian Gulf War. The House measure called for $4.24
billion in supplemental appropriations, of which $1.13
billion would be designated as "emergency". The significant
disparity in the requested versus House-passed funding was
due to a House-included provision for $650 million in aid to
Israel, $333 million in "emergency" defense funds and $58
million in veterans benefits that the President had not
requested. [Ref 17]
On March 13, 1991, the House approved HR 1175, a
supplemental appropriations bill that incorporated a
generous veterans and military benefits package. It passed
by a vote of 398-25. The bill carried a $1.4 billion price
tag over 5 years and provided a variety of health, housing,
education and other benefits for not only Gulf War veterans,
but other veterans and military personnel as well. Further,
HR 1175 included language that would require the President
to declare all of the spending "emergency". At the time of
approval of HR 1175, the President had already warned that
18
he would veto the measure due to its high costs. The prime
reason for this veto threat was the administration's concern
over greatly expanded GI education benefits that were
contained in the package. [Ref 18]
On March 14, 1991, the Senate Appropriations Committee
approved S 578, its own version of HR 1175, the military
benefits package. The Senate bill had a five-year cost of
about $500 million and passed by a vote of 97-1. While this
version also proposed no offsets in funding and was
designated as "emergency" spending, it had been drafted with
bipartisan input and enjoyed White House backing. While the
House used two separate appropriations bills, the Senate
Appropriations Committee included its veteran's benefit
package within its bill for war-related and other "dire
emergency" spending (in effect combining HR 1175 and
HR 1281) . [Ref 18] The Senate Appropriations Committee
package called for a total of $5.23 billion in
appropriations for various programs. [Ref 19]
Shortly after the House approved the $650 million in aid
for Israel included as part of HR 1281, representatives of
Turkey approached the Bush Administration requesting a
similar amount. After some discussions between the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, Richard Darman, and
Senator Byrd (D-WV) , the administration agreed to request
$200 million in "emergency" aid for Turkey and, further, to
19
formally request the $650 million in "emergency" aid for
Israel.
By the time the Senate approved S 578, the total
administration request had been expanded to $3.7 billion as
a result of the requests for emergency funding for aid to
Israel and Turkey. Of this amount, $940 million was
designated "emergency". Of the $5.23 billion approved by
the Senate, $1.03 billion was designated as "emergency".
Additionally, $500 million approved for "emergency" military
benefits was to be provided from the Defense Cooperation
Account. 2 [Ref 20]
A flurry of activity rapidly concluded congressional
action on these measures as Congress succeeded in approving
the measures before the spring recess. On March 21, 1991, a
House-Senate compromise was reached on the veteran's
package. The conferees agreed to a cost of $655 million
over five years, the largest loser being the GI educational
benefits provision of the House measure (HR 1175) . The full
Senate approved the veteran's benefits compromise measure
(S 725) later that day by voice vote. The House approved
the measure by a vote of 396-4 the same day. On March 22,
1991, the funding for the veteran's benefits and the other
"Dire Emergency" programs were appropriated in HR 1281 by
The Defense Cooperation Account was a fund that
contained allied financial contributions to the Persian Gulf
War. It was drawn upon in each of the four supplemental
appropriation bills that were initiated in 1991. [Ref 20]
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voice vote in the Senate and by a vote of 340-48 in the
House.
Under an agreement between the Administration and
Congress, spending for veteran's and military benefits was
designated as "emergency" and excluded from the existing
budget caps. [Ref 21] Of the $5.45 billion total
appropriated for the "Dire Emergency" supplemental, $3.7
billion had been requested by the President. This $5.45
billion included $1.7 billion in "emergency" spending,
compared to the administration's request for only $939.7
million in "emergency" spending, $4.1 billion in "non-
emergency" spending and $396 million in rescissions in
international spending. [Ref 22]
President Bush signed Public Law 102-27, Dire Emergency
Supplemental Appropriation For Consequences Of Operation
Desert Storm/Desert Shield, Food Stamps, Unemployment
Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation And
Pensions And Other Urgent Needs Act Of 1991, on April 10,
1991. Public Law 102-27 was the consummation of HR 1175,
HR 1281, S 578 and S 725.
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENACTMENTS AND REQUESTS
The 1991 "Dire Emergency" supplemental appropriated
$5.45 billion for emergency and other funds. This was $1.75
billion greater than the $3.7 billion requested by the
President. In other words, this resulted in a ratio of 1.47
21
enacted to requested funds. With respect to "emergency"
funds within the bill, the President's request of $939.7
million was raised to $1.7 billion.
However, $655 million in veterans benefits were funded
from the Defense Cooperation Account, leaving the amount of
"emergency" funding to be provided by the United States
Treasury at $1.03 billion. Congress appeared to be using
the Defense Cooperation Account to expand the available
"emergency" fund base, thereby circumventing the discipline
of the BEA. These funds, exempt from the budget caps of the
BEA, had an enacted to requested ratio of 1.1. TABLE 4-1
breaks down the funds into categories by department. It
does not include amounts transferred from other accounts
that do not add to the cost of the bill. [Ref 22]
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TABLE 4-1 DIRE EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING
Budget Authority of HR 1281 in millions of dollars
I'ri'.siik'iit's 1 1 oust Senate Final
Request Passed Passed Bill
EMERGENCY
Defense $333.6
Commerce 7.4 $0.9 $17.9
Veterans 58.0 37.0 37.0
Justice $7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
State 53.4 54.4 53.4 53.4
District of Columbia 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Funds appropriated to the President
(includes aid to Israel and Turkey) 856.0 656.0 856.0 856.0
Legislative Branch 12 1 7.1 7.9 7.4
Treasury 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Military Benefits* 550.0 705.0
Subtotal 939.7 1129.8 1528.5 1690.0
NON-EMERGENCY
Defense 407.5 150.0
Commerce -2.1 -12.5 -11.4
Veterans 303.1 303.1 962.6 962.6
Justice 9.2 11.2 16.2 15.8
State 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.1
District of Columbia 100.0 100.0 100.0
Legislative Branch 1 0.1 1
Judiciary 79.9 79.9 78.3 79.1
Interior 30.0 20.0 25.0
Energy 623.0 603.1 623.1 623.1
Health and Human Services 232.0 232.0 249.0 249.0
Agriculture 1511.0 1567.9 1569.3 1569.3
Transportation 14.5 14.5 34.5 34.5
Housing and Urban Development -17.5 -45.0 -45.0 -68.0
Subtotal 2763.2 3110.3 3703.7 3756.8
Total 3702.9 4240.1 5232.2 5446.8
*A11 but $50 million to be transferred from the Defense Cooperation Account
Of the 64 individual items either requested by the
President, enacted by the Congress or passed by one or both
houses of Congress, only seven had funds enacted that were
less than requested by the President 3 . The dollar total for
these seven items was $768.8 million. Congress exceeded the
President's request on 30 items, for a total of $1,383.9
3 The 64 items do not include items whose funds were
transferred from other accounts and, thus, did not add to the
bill's dollar total.
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million. Further, Congress did not accept, or fully accept,
presidential rescission requests in seven cases totalling
$491.7 million, and enacted one rescission for $24 million
that the President did not request. On 19 items the amount
appropriated by Congress matched the amount requested by the
President. [Ref 22]
Congress funded six items not requested by the President
by transferring funds from either the Defense Cooperation
Account or from other accounts. These transfers helped push
the bill total to $5.45 billion. They are also part of the
difference between the appropriated and requested dollar
amounts.
But the largest difference between the request and the
final congressional appropriation is found in funding for
military benefits. The President had requested no funds for
this purpose, while Congress appropriated $705 million. Of
the $705 million, $655 million was transferred from the
Defense Cooperation Account as a result of the compromise
reached between House and Senate committee members.
Other items that were appropriated funds in significant
excess of that requested by the President were (dollar
amounts appropriated above the request shown in parens)
:
Defense, Operations and Maintenance and Research and
Development ($100 million) , District of Columbia, Essential
Municipal Services ($150 million), Veterans Compensation
Pensions ($409.5 million) and Housing and Urban Development,
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Public Housing Operating Subsidies ($75 million) . In
addition, rescission reductions of $263.3 million for
Housing and Urban Development Public Housing and $135
million for the Housing and Urban Development Rehabilitation
Loan Fund enacted by Congress further significantly
contributed to the disparity between appropriations and
requests. [Ref 22]
These effects were offset to some degree by Congress'
refusal to provide funds for Housing and Urban Development
HOME Investment Partnerships ($500 million) , HOPE Grants
($165 million) and Homeless Rental Housing Assistance ($80
million) . In the other four areas that Congress "saved"
money, the appropriated amount was a total of $23.8 million
less than the amount requested by the President. [Ref 22]
As with the period before the passage of the BEA, the
first supplemental enacted after its passage exhibited
several traits that suggest that the supplemental
appropriation process was going to be used as a vehicle to
attain funding otherwise unavailable for parochial
congressional projects. For example, when Congress
appropriated more for individual items than the President
requested, this total dollar amount appropriated was greater
than the total dollar amount appropriated below his
individual item requests. The ratio was, in fact, almost
two to one. This is a slight improvement from the nearly
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three to one ratio of 1981-1989, though it still indicates a
trend towards supplemental appropriation inflation.
Similarly, in terms of individual items, when Congress
did not agree with the President's reguest, it was more
likely to appropriate more than the reguested amount. In
fact, this ratio rose dramatically from about 1.5 to one in
the period 1981-1989, to more than four to one in the "Dire
Emergency" Supplemental Appropriation Bill.
Further, the 1.47 ratio of enacted to reguested funds
for the "Dire Emergency" supplemental, when compared to the
1981-1989 baseline of 1.02, would indicate a worsening
trend. This trend was somewhat mitigated by the
administration's policy of playing hardball in the use of
its "emergency" designation.
Despite these continuing, and in some cases worsening,
trends, evidence of congressional restraint in supplemental
appropriation spending is easily found in a review of the
political debate that accompanied the bill.
C. SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DEBATE
On the whole, Public Law 102-27, the "Dire Emergency"
Supplemental, was a victory for those in Congress and the
administration who wished to restrain supplemental
appropriation spending. Warned that the administration was
likely to withhold "emergency" designation from a variety of
items included in the congressional bills, and that spending
26
above the BEA ceilings would eventually trigger automatic
cuts, House and Senate conferees agreed to trim their
spending plans. Once the White House was satisfied that it
had gotten virtually everything that it had asked for, the
strong veto threat that Office of Management and Budget
Director Darman had issued was dropped. [Ref 22]
A comparison of the initial House-passed legislation
with the Senate-approved measure shows several significant
differences between the two bills. Overall, the Senate
version was $882 million larger than the House bill because
the Senate combined veterans benefits with war-related and
other emergency requirements into a single bill, while the
House used two bills for this purpose. If the $1.4 billion
HR 1175 bill for military benefits is included, then the
House version is $518 million more costly.
The Senate desired higher spending than the House on 16
different items, and the House desired more than the Senate
on 14 items. [Ref 22] While this would seem to be a fairly
even disposition that might lead to an equitable compromise
in the conference committee, the results of the conference
were decidedly in the Senate's favor.
Of the 30 items on which the House and Senate disagreed
on funding levels, the Senate value was reported out of
conference 20 times, and the House value just once. The
appropriated amount was a compromise between the two figures
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in eight instances. 4 Oddly enough, one of the appropriated
amounts agreed to in conference exceeded both the House and
Senate versions. [Ref 22] Clearly, the Senate version of
the "Dire Emergency" supplemental, which, as previously
described, had bipartisan formulation and administration
support, won the conference committee battle.
Several House programs were cut in their entirety when
the two bills went to conference. Included among these were
all Commerce Department "emergency" proposals ($6.4 million)
and all Department of Defense "emergency" proposals ($323.6
million)
.
On the other hand, several Senate programs that had not
received any House funding were reported out of conference
at or above the full Senate amount. These included:
"emergency" aid to Turkey ($200 million), "emergency"
funding for the Customs Service ($1.8 million), the
"emergency" military benefits package ($705 million), 5
vaccine injury compensation ($17 million) and veterans
readjustment benefits ($250 million) . Additionally, the
Senate veterans benefits and compensation package ($712.6
4 The military benefits package is being considered a
compromise as it appropriates funds with a value between the
Senate provision of $500 million and the $1.4 billion provided
in HR 1175.
5 If the $1.4 billion HR 1175 bill is considered an
integral part of these conference negotiations then the
military benefits item would not be considered in this
category, but would be a compromise that closely approached
the Senate value.
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million) replaced the House version ($303.1 million).
[Ref 22]
The Administration enjoyed "unaccustomed success in
knocking spending items out of the supplemental." [Ref 9]
Among these were appropriations included by the House to
fund three "emergency" items sought by Commerce Department
agencies. At the outset of the Gulf Crisis, some agencies,
including the Commerce Department, began withdrawing their
people out of embassies in the Middle East. Still others
began providing services to the Department of Defense
related to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Congress
had agreed with the agencies that these costs were
legitimate war-related expenses and that as such they should
not come out of their existing budgets.
The White House disagreed. 0MB threatened a mini-
sequester if Congress tried to count the money as
"emergency" spending, exempt from the budget limits. The
threatened measure was not needed, however, as Congress
agreed to eliminate all of the questionable expenditures
during the conference. [Ref 22]
Similarly, 0MB was able to eliminate a dairy provision
that Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) had tried to attach to the
"Dire Emergency" supplemental. The dairy provision was
proposed as an "emergency" requirement in accordance with
the BEA, and thus would have required no spending offsets to
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avoid a mini-sequester. It was dropped from the final bill
at White House insistence.
These two actions led Representative Neal Smith (D-
Iowa) , Chairman of the Commerce, Justice, State
Appropriations Subcommittee, Representative David Obey (D-
Wis) and Senator Leahy to complain bitterly about the new
administration clout. "It is going to be very easy for OMB
to threaten sequestration every time they don't like
something Congress wants to do. We didn't elect presidents
to be kings," Representative Obey said. [Ref 9]
Some members of Congress attempted to limit the use of
the "emergency" designation in favor of offsetting the costs
of congressional additions to the supplemental bill. These
efforts were not successful. Representative Leon Panetta
(D-Calif) and Representative Will Gradison, Jr (R-Ohio)
submitted an amendment to remove the "emergency" designation
from the veterans bill and force Congress to offset the
costs. The measure failed 175-248. [Ref 13] Yet even in
failing, the fact that a relatively close vote occurred on a
popular veterans program measure in a time of patriotic
fervor, led many to believe that the "emergency" requirement
might eventually rein in supplemental appropriations.
Other House spending that did not enjoy Administration
support was also stripped out of the bill in conference.
The House had sought $224 million in funds to procure 342
Patriot missiles beyond the numbers used in the Gulf War.
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The final bill eliminated this money as well as other House-
approved defense funding that totalled nearly $600 million.
Slightly over half of this eliminated spending had been
designated by the House as "emergency". [Ref 22]
Despite OMB ' s apparent new clout in supplemental
matters, the "Dire Emergency" bill demonstrated that
Congress was anything but powerless. In fact, the overt
action taken by OMB to eliminate small proposals here and
there pales in comparison to the areas in which the White
House backed down.
For example, aid for Israel and Turkey had been
pointedly left out of the administration's initial request
for Desert Storm-related supplemental appropriations. The
money proved popular in the House, however, surviving an
effort by Representative Tim Valentine (D-NC) to eliminate
the money after it had been included in the bill.
Valentine's measure failed overwhelmingly by a 24-397 vote.
When $850 million was appropriated for Israel and Turkey
by the House and Senate, OMB agreed to score these funds as
"emergency" spending. [Ref 9] This avoided a confrontation
with Congress over aid to staunch allies while further
preventing the international discretionary appropriations
category from exceeding its cap which would have required
the State Department to cut aid to other countries.
Congress accomplished this by going public with their plans,
giving the White House as its only alternative a rejection
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of the aid, which may have hindered Baker's efforts in the
Mideast. [Ref 9]
Another example showing that Congress still had
supplementary appropriation clout was demonstrated by the
success that Congress enjoyed in providing funds for the
states to handle unemployment insurance claims. The
Administration's original "non-emergency" request of $100
million was raised to $200 million by the House and settled
in informal discussions between the House and Senate
leadership at $150 million. While negotiations were under
way between the House and the Senate, OMB agreed to score
the $150 million as "emergency" funding. [Ref 16] Indeed,
House Republicans seemed dismayed at OMB ' s willingness to
negotiate on matters in the Senate or in conference that
they had said they would never call an emergency when the
subject arose in the House. [Ref 22]
Congress' leverage was further demonstrated when
Representative Smith warned that he would consider including
language in the next regular appropriations bill prohibiting
Commerce Department agencies from doing any work for the
Department of Defense before receiving payment. This was in
response to the White House's refusal to designate as
"emergency" the Commerce Department funds that Smith had
felt were justifiable Gulf War expenses. Further, he said
he might get OMB ' s attention by slashing funds for something
that the Administration wanted. [Ref 9]
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The BEA had given the President new means by which he
could control supplemental appropriation spending. However,
this power was not effectively exercised by the White House.
The "unaccustomed success" that the White House enjoyed on
this bill did not yield significant results, as the
Administration appeared willing to back down on some
significant items for the sake of political expediency.
As George Hager stated:
In the final analysis, the restraining hand of the White
House appeared throughout the scores of provisions,
scaling back many of the lawmakers' more ambitious
attempts to spend money .... [Yet despite this apparent
control], the lesson seems to be that OMB • s authority over
emergency spending is not absolute, especially when it
comes to high profile items. "They've got more power on
the smaller things than they do on the bigger, more
visible things," says Stan Collender, Director of Federal
Budget Policy for Price Waterhouse. [Ref 22]
An analysis of the second supplemental appropriation
enacted following the passage of the BEA will serve to
reinforce or refute the apparent erosion of supplemental
appropriation spending control apparent in the "Dire
Emergency" supplemental appropriation bill when it is
compared with the 1981-1989 baseline. The next chapter will
examine this second bill.
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V. FY 1991 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION NUMBER 2:
THE "OPERATION DESERT STORM" SUPPLEMENTAL
The second supplemental appropriation to be passed
during 1991 was the Desert Storm spending bill (Public Law
102-28) . It progressed through Congress largely hand-in-
hand with the "Dire Emergency" supplemental (Public Law 102-
27) . By CBO scoring, the Desert Storm supplemental
consisted of $42,626 billion in "emergency" appropriations.
[Ref 23] It was designed to pay for the Persian Gulf War. 6
[Ref 24]
A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
On February 22, 1991, the President reguested $15
billion in United States funds, as well as authority to
appropriate $52.5 billion in contributions expected from
other nations, for the war with Irag. In a February 28,
1991, markup, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
Future supplemental appropriation bills would make
"adjustments" to the amount appropriated under the Desert
Storm supplemental. These adjustments would be for changes in
the costs attributable to the Persian Gulf War that were
covered by the Desert Storm supplemental. In the case of
supplementals where such "adjustments" were made, these
"adjustments" will not be considered as "new" appropriations.
Only Desert Storm-related appropriations which changed the
scope of the funding from that called for in the Desert Storm
supplemental will be considered in the calculation of the
enacted to reguested ratio.
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approved the $15 billion but limited the remainder to $28
billion after a careful review of the request for items that
the Administration submitted as legitimate "incremental"
costs of the war. 7 [Ref 25]
On March 7 , 1991, the House of Representatives approved
HR 1282, the Operation Desert Storm supplemental bill by a
vote of 380-19. The $42,588 billion passed by the House was
designed to provide a "down payment" on costs that were
expected to escalate if actual combat costs were proven to
have been more than estimated. Funding for the war was
expected to come, if at all possible, from foreign
contributions. But HR 1282 gave authorization for the $15
billion in U. S. funds requested by the President as a
"bridge loan" until it could be replaced by foreign
contributions. [Ref 17]
On March 14, 1991, the Senate Appropriations Committee
approved HR 1282 with only minor changes [Ref 19] and the
full Senate approved the bill on March 19, 1991, by a vote
of 98-1. [Ref 24] As with HR 1281, the "Dire Emergency"
supplemental, HR 1282 rapidly came to fruition as the spring
recess approached, with the House-Senate conferees reporting
out the final version of the bill on March 21, 1991. The
The term "incremental" is described in the BEA as
those costs that were incurred above those that would have
been incurred had no deployment been made to drive Iraqi
forces from Kuwait. It was the "incremental" costs of the
Persian Gulf War that were to be considered "emergency" under
the BEA. [Ref 8]
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conference committee report called for $42,667 billion to
cover the "incremental" costs of the Persian Gulf War. In
accordance with the BEA, these funds would be considered
"emergency". Like the House version, the conference report
provided for the President's $15 billion "bridge loan", with
the United States' costs eventually being covered by foreign
contributions. [Ref 24]
The conference agreement on HR 1282 was adopted on March
22, 1991, by a vote of 379-11 in the House and by a voice
vote in the Senate. [Ref 17] The President signed Public
Law 102-28, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1991, into law on April 10,
1991.
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENACTMENTS AND REQUESTS
The 1991 Operation Desert Storm supplemental
appropriation bill provided $42,626 billion in "emergency"
funding for the Persian Gulf War. The President had
requested $15 billion in United States funds to create a
Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund. These were the funds
that were to act as a "bridge loan" until foreign
contributions could replace them. They were expected to be
replaced by contributions to the Defense Cooperation Account
by our allies. He had also requested authority for the
Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $52.5 billion in
additional funds from amounts deposited in the Defense
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Cooperation Account to cover the "incremental" costs of the
Persian Gulf War. [Ref 23] Using this as a basis for
determining the ratio of enacted appropriations to requested
appropriations yields a ratio of 1.0 as the President
requested the "incremental" costs and Congress appropriated
those same costs.
C. SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DEBATE
The Desert Storm supplemental bore significant White
House shaping. As with the "Dire Emergency" supplemental,
the White House was again more successful in achieving its
goals than might have been expected. However, the White
House's success in this case had little to do with the
threat of mini-sequesters, since the entire bill was by
definition "emergency" spending in accordance with the BEA.
This was due to the statutory language of the BEA that
considered costs for the Persian Gulf War to be emergency
requirements without further action.
Instead, the pressure to keep the bill free of add-ons
was a result of public support for the White House's
handling of the Persian Gulf War. To quote one observer:
"Members [of Congress] were loath to be seen obstructing the
Desert Storm bill, so the Bush administration was unusually
successful in pressuring conferees to pare back
Congressional add ons." [Ref 24]
37
There was relatively little significant political debate
in either the House or Senate prior to voting on this
supplemental. [Refs 11,24] Most in Congress, including
those members initially opposed to the Gulf War, had agreed
in February to raise no obstacles to fully financing the
Gulf War. [Ref 26] The two bills were largely identical in
language and required the Pentagon to give the House and
Senate Armed Service Committees seven days notice before
allocating the funds which Congress would appropriate. This
notice would indicate the amount involved and the purpose
for which it was intended. [Ref 19]
This requirement for notification was a concession to
those in Congress who were skeptical of Pentagon intentions.
Congressional skeptics scrutinized the bill to ensure that
there was no effort by the Department of Defense to pad the
bill with spending for programs not related to the Persian
Gulf War. The skeptics had some reason to be concerned.
The initial $6.4 billion request for procurement that the
Department of Defense had submitted on March 1, 1991, as
Operation Desert Storm "incremental" costs raised eyebrows
in Congress when the individual items in this request neatly
dovetailed with the Pentagon's earlier regular budget
request.
For example, in 1990, the Pentagon had projected the
need to acquire 19,760 TOW anti-tank missiles, 600 Tomahawk
cruise missiles and 440 Patriot missiles in 1991. But the
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1991 budget request submitted by the Pentagon asked for only
10,000 TOW missiles, 236 Tomahawk missiles and no Patriot
missiles. [Ref 27] The $6.4 billion Desert Storm
supplemental procurement request asked for funding of 9,600
TOW missiles, 400 Tomahawk missiles and 500 Patriot
missiles. [Ref 27] These figures brought the total
Pentagon request close to the initial projections.
It appeared to some in Congress that the Pentagon was
playing a game of hide and seek on funding using the Desert
Storm supplemental as cover. The perceived intent of the
Pentagon was reinforced by the fact that only 150 Patriot
missiles had been used to that point in the Gulf War. The
Pentagon reduced its $6.4 billion procurement request to
$2.9 billion [Ref 27], causing skeptics to become even more
vigilant.
One result of these fears was the previously discussed
notification of Congress requirement. A second result of
congressional fears about Pentagon intentions was HR 586.
By a vote of 393-1 on February 21, 1991, the House passed a
requirement that the President make monthly reports to
Congress of United States costs from the Gulf War and allied
contributions made to offset these costs. Initially opposed
by the White House, a compromise was reached on the wording
to require that "incremental" costs of specific categories
be reported as well as amounts promised and delivered by
other countries. [Ref 26]
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As previously described, there was little debate on HR
1282 prior to its passage. Most members of Congress steered
clear of anything politically controversial. One member who
proved to be an exception to this rule was Senator Byrd (D-
WV) . Prior to Senate passage, he renewed earlier criticism
of allied governments that were too slow in providing their
pledged contributions. The Senate version of the bill
reflected his opinion and included a provision that barred
sales of arms to any country that had not made their
promised contributions. [Ref 24]
The White House objected to this wording with OMB
stating, "there can be delays caused by U.S. action or
inaction." This referred to the fact that some foreign
payments were pegged to specific Pentagon cost calculations.
Demonstrating the influence of the White House, conferees
responded by changing the wording to state that arms sales
were banned to any country "that has not fulfilled its
commitment." This wording eliminated the wording that the
White House had found objectionable while allowing Senator
Byrd to advise his colleagues that "it means the same thing
[as the earlier wording]." [Ref 24]
There were two areas in which the House and Senate
versions of HR 1282 differed. In the first, the House
attempted to include increased fuel costs for Department of
Defense activities outside of the forces in the Persian Gulf
within this supplemental. The Senate, however, disapproved,
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and in the conference report these costs were allowed to be
funded from the use of foreign contributions but not U.S.
funds. [Ref 12]
In the second, the Senate refused to count as
appropriate improvements to the Virginia telephone system
that the House had included, feeling that they were not
reasonably attributable to Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. In the conference report this measure was adopted
but at a reduced level of funding. [Ref 12]
Of the eight major categories of spending spelled out in
HR 1282, the House and Senate agreed on spending levels for
three. 8 In the Personnel, Operations and Maintenance,
Procurement and Research and Development categories, the
House figure was greater than the Senate figure. On the
Combat Operations item, the Senate funding was greater than
that of the House. The individual differences and their
cumulative result were small. [Ref 24]
In the cases of Operations and Maintenance, Personnel
and Combat Operations, the conferees reached agreement about
midway between the two values. In the Procurement as well
as the Research and Development categories, the final
conference report called for more funds than either of the
original bills. [Ref 24]
8 The spending categories of HR 1282 can be broken down
into the following: Personnel, Operations and Maintenance,
Procurement, Research and Development, Revolving Funds, Combat
Operations, Military Construction and Coast Guard Operations.
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Yet another success for the White House was the
exclusion in the final bill of a Senate-passed provision
which barred transfers of captured or deployed weapons to
other countries without approved legislation. However, in
keeping with then-existing arms sales laws, the bill did
require that Congress be notified prior to transfer or sale
of any U.S. or captured equipment, thus allowing Congress to
block any transfer by enacting a joint resolution. [Ref 24]
Politically, the White House enjoyed considerable
success in limiting congressional spending in Public Law
102-28. But this success was largely due to the perceived
public pressure felt by the legislators to support the
Administration's proposal, rather than the new authority
enjoyed by the President to control supplemental
appropriations. As a House Democratic aide said, the
Democrats wanted to keep the bill so clean that it was
"sterile" to avoid the charge that the democrats converted a
must-pass bill for war "into a traditional Congressional
Christmas tree." [Ref 25]
The Desert Storm supplemental is a special case among
the supplementals taken up by Congress during 1991. It was
exempt from the BEA caps on discretionary spending
categories as provided by the language in the BEA. Both the
Congress and the Administration felt compelled to keep it
clean. That is, both wished to avoid abusing the privileged
status that the supplemental had. Congress did have to
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exercise vigilance to prevent the Department of Defense from
converting the supplemental into an alternate method of
funding defense requirements. As a high-profile,
statutorily defined emergency, this bill received special
treatment by both lawmakers and the executive branch.
An analysis of the third supplemental appropriation bill
enacted following the passage of the BEA should provide
evidence as to whether on not the BEA enhanced spending
control in supplemental appropriations. Chapter VI examines
the third supplemental appropriation bill enacted following
the passage of the BEA.
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VI. FY 1991 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION NUMBER 3:
THE "HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE" SUPPLEMENTAL
The third supplemental appropriation enacted during FY
1991 was the so-called "Humanitarian Assistance"
supplemental. The official title of this bill is the Dire
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations From Contributions Of
Foreign Governments And/Or Interest For Humanitarian
Assistance To Refugees And Displaced Persons In And Around
Iraq As A Result Of The Recent Invasion Of Kuwait And For
Peacekeeping Activities And Other Urgent Needs Act Of 1991,
Public Law 102-55. By CBO estimates, the Humanitarian
Assistance supplemental appropriated $572 million largely to
help pay for assistance to refugees in northern Iraq
displaced by the Persian Gulf War. Of this amount, $337
million was attributed to defense discretionary
appropriations, and $236 million went to international
discretionary appropriation accounts. [Ref 28]
This supplemental included language stating that "Funds
made available in this Act, being incremental costs of
'Operation Desert Storm' or offset, similar to the items of
the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public
Law 102-27, and the Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Supplemental Appropriation Act, Public Law 102-28, are off-
budget." [Ref 29] The emergency Desert Shield costs
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exception of the BEA is stretched in this case by the
inclusion of international assistance funds within the
notion of "incremental" costs of the defense effort in the
Persian Gulf. [Ref 28]
The bill included only costs for the military's role in
the Iraqi relief operation through the end of May, 1991.
Senator Byrd predicted that "We're going to be there well
beyond May, certainly into summer .... before we can extract
ourselves," opening the door for future supplemental
appropriations measures.
A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
On April 11, 1991, the Senate approved by voice vote a
resolution (S Res 99) urging "sustained humanitarian relief"
for Iraqi refugees. [Ref 30] On April 18, 1991, the Senate
approved a Kurdish relief bill (S 786) authorizing $50
million to aid the Kurds. [Ref 31]
On April 23, 1991, the House Foreign Affairs Committee
marked up legislation authorizing a supplemental
appropriation of up to $400 million for aid to Iraqi
refugees and $25 million in increased spending authority for
the State Department's emergency refugee account, two days
before the administration had even submitted a request for
this purpose. On April 25, President Bush requested $150.5
million in supplemental appropriations to fund "Operation
Provide Comfort", the administration's Iraqi refugee relief
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effort. The administration also requested the transfer of
"such sums as may be necessary. ... [to meet] incremental
costs of humanitarian assistance" from the Defense
Cooperation Account. The administration requested that
these transfers be free from congressional approval.
[Ref 32]
On May 9, 1991, separate versions of HR 2251, the
"Humanitarian Assistance" supplemental appropriation bill,
were passed in the House and the Senate. The Senate version
called for $556 million in "emergency" funding, $16 million
lower than the House version. It also included several
amendments as well as a number of subtle yet significant
distinctions from the House bill. [Ref 33] The House bill
was passed with minimal debate by a vote of 384-25 in the
House and by a voice vote in the Senate.
Following a week of unsuccessful informal talks
attempting to iron out differences between the two bills,
the Senate appointed on May 15, conferees to a committee on
the bill. The House followed suit on May 20, 1991.
[Ref 34] On May 22, 1991, the conference committee report
on HR 2251 was approved by both houses in a vote of 387-33
in the House, and by a voice vote in the Senate. [Ref 35]
HR 2251 appropriated $572 million in "emergency" funds,
divided between international and defense discretionary
accounts. International discretionary spending included
$143 million for Refugee Aid, $67 million for International
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Disaster Assistance, and $25.5 million for International
Peacekeeping Activities. Defense received $2 million for
Military Personnel, $318.5 million for Operations and
Maintenance and $16 million for Military Relief Societies.
The $235.5 million appropriated for international
discretionary spending was to be drawn from the Defense
Cooperation Account or interest payments deposited to the
credit of the account. Funds in the supplemental for the
Department of Defense were to be provided by the Persian
Gulf Regional Defense Fund, with the exception of the aid to
military relief societies, which was only to be taken from
interest payments credited to the Defense Cooperation
Account. [Ref 29]
The President signed the "Humanitarian Assistance"
supplemental into law on June 13, 1991.
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENACTMENTS AND REQUESTS
The third supplemental appropriations bill enacted
following the passage of the BEA was triggered by the
President's request for $150.5 million in supplemental
appropriations for international discretionary funds
replenishment. This request included an "indefinite"
appropriation for the "incremental" costs of the Department
of Defense for Operation Provide Comfort, to be funded by
the Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund. In response to this
request, Congress appropriated $235.5 million for
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international discretionary funds replenishment and another
$336.5 million for the Department of Defense in
"incremental" costs for the Persian Gulf War. [Ref 36]
Using logic similar to that used in the analysis of the
Operation Desert Storm supplemental, the Department of
Defense funding was provided on a precisely one to one ratio
to that which was reguested. The President reguested
authority to fund further "incremental" costs of Operation
Desert Storm. These "incremental" costs had been previously
defined in the Operation Desert Storm supplemental and were
statutorily covered by the BEA. The President needed only
to reguest their appropriation.
Thus, $572 million was appropriated by Congress, $235.5
million for international discretionary funds replenishment,
$320.5 million for the "incremental" costs of the Persian
Gulf War and $16 million in support for organizations that
aided servicemen. This compared to $471 million reguested
by the President, $150.5 for international discretionary
funds replenishment and $320.5 for the "incremental" costs
of the Persian Gulf War. The enacted to reguested ratio,
therefore, can be calculated to be 1.21.
Specifically, of the four items 9 addressed in the
international section of the bill, the contributions for
9 The four individual international accounts specified
in HR 2251 were Department of State International
Peacekeeping, Migration and Refugee Assistance, United States
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance and the Agency for
International Development, International Disaster Assistance.
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International Peacekeeping and United States Emergency
Refugee and Migration Assistance were funded at the levels
requested - $25.5 million and 75 million respectively. The
International Disaster Assistance category was raised from
$27 million to $67 million, and the Migration and Refugee
Assistance category was raised from $23 million to $68
million. [Ref 36]
C. SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DEBATE
The influence that the White House had exerted on
Congress during the formulation of the "Dire Emergency"
supplemental and the Operation Desert Storm supplemental in
March, 1991, appears to have waned by May when Congress was
acting upon the "Humanitarian Assistance" supplemental. The
success that the White House had had in shaping the earlier
measures was more limited in this case. The White House and
its Congressional allies still enjoyed some success in
formulating the bill, but analysts were no longer touting
the administration's "unaccustomed success" in getting its
way.
Instead, the tone of the analysts indicated less
surprise with the outcome. Quoting Congressional Quarterly,
"The White House again managed to keep domestic add-ons at
bay when Congress approved a $572 million supplemental May
22, primarily for assistance for refugees in Iraq and
elsewhere." [Ref 37] However, it appeared as though there
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was little effort by Congress to attempt add-ons in this
instance, so White House success is less impressive.
Further, the House of Representatives took a more
aggressive stand on its positions regarding this
supplemental than it had in the earlier bills. While a
compromise position was eventually attained between the
House and the Senate, the results of the compromise were
much more eguitable in this case than in the earlier
supplemental bills of the year. In the earlier bills, the
Senate position, which was closer to that of the
Administration, most frequently prevailed.
Both the House and Senate versions of HR 2251 called for
$235.5 million in appropriations for international
discretionary funds replenishment. This was $85 million
more than the administration had requested. However, the
House and Senate differed in their methods for obtaining the
additional funds. The House called for reducing aid to
Pakistan to provide the funds. 10 The Senate, on the other
hand, wanted to use the interest that had been accruing in
the Defense Cooperation Account and leave the Pakistan aid
untouched. The Senate plan was backed by the White House,
which had initially proposed financing its $150.5 million
request from the accrued interest as well. [Ref 34]
10 $100 million for economic support fund aid to Pakistan
had been passed in FY 1991 contingent upon the
administration's ability to certify that Pakistan did not
possess nuclear weapons. When this was not possible, the $100
million became available for other programs.
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When presented with this option in conference, the House
conferees agreed, seeing the opportunity to possibly use the
Pakistan funds for other projects that the House supported.
The House did, however, win inclusion of a requirement that
the administration notify Congress before reallocating the
Pakistan aid. [Ref 29]
Another difference between the House and Senate
versions of HR 2251 was the total amount to be appropriated.
The House figure was $572 million, while that of the Senate
was $556 million. The difference was caused by the Senate
stripping from its version $16 million in Persian Gulf
Regional Defense Fund interest intended to support
organizations that aided United States servicemen and their
families. Senator Byrd called the measure "well meaning but
misguided," as it could have triggered an avalanche of
requests from other private groups. [Ref 33]
This Senate action drew strong opposition from key
members of the House Appropriations Committee. Particularly
irked by the Senate action was Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa)
,
Chairman of the Appropriations Committee Defense
Subcommittee, who strongly backed the measure. [Ref 34] In
the end, the conference committee reported out in favor of
the House on this issue, including the $16 million as part
of the bill. [Ref 35]
A third difference between the House and Senate versions
of HR 2251 was the inclusion of a statement in the Senate
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version that raised the ceilings on administration transfer
limits on the Food for Peace program." House members
questioned the administration for details on why the program
ceilings should be lifted. [Ref 34] In the conference
report, references to the Senate provision were dropped.
[Ref 29]
A final difference between the two bills was the
inclusion of a Senate amendment that removed restrictions on
the International Trade Administration's export promotion
expenditures. The House conferees agreed to the Senate
provision, without which the agency could have faced a $12.9
million cut. [Ref 35]
Both the House and the Senate used HR 2251 to pressure
the administration to consider another appropriation measure
later in the year. [Ref 33] They did this by including a
provision in the bill requiring OMB to conduct a study of
the "unfunded costs of dire emergencies" in the United
States:
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
using $35,000 of funds previously appropriated under this
head in Public Law 101-509, shall prepare a report on the
unfunded costs of dire emergencies, existing because of
floods, droughts, tornadoes, unemployment and other
disasters in the United States and submit the report to
the appropriate committees in Congress within 10 days of
the enactment of this Act, pending receipt of a budget
request. [Ref 29]
11 The Food for Peace program is a program under which
needy countries get free or discounted commodities from the
United States government.
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In another confrontation with the White House, the House
Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense balked at
the President's request that the administration have
unlimited authority to pay for the military component of the
relief. Rep. Murtha told Sean O'Keefe, Comptroller for the
Department of Defense, "The Comptroller knows we're not
going to leave this open-ended." [Ref 38] The limited
funding precedent that had been set in the "Dire Emergency"
supplemental was again followed in the "Humanitarian
Assistance" supplemental. The Congress appropriated
specific amounts for Department of Defense Personnel and
Operations and Maintenance - enough only to last through the
end of May, 1991.
The House Appropriations Committee knew that this action
was pressuring the White House to wind down the United
States military presence inside Iraq. By funding the
operations only through the month of May, the House hoped to
accelerate the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping
personnel and the subsequent removal of United States
military personnel. [Ref 38]
One final note on the politics surrounding HR 2251,
again involved Senator Byrd. Still critical of allied
financial backing for the Persian Gulf War, Senator Byrd
also noted their lack of support for the "Humanitarian
Assistance" initiative: "American taxpayers are footing
almost the whole tab [of Operation Provide Comfort ] . . . .The
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American taxpayer has a right to know when it all stops."
[Ref 33]
Clearly, with the passage of the "Humanitarian
Assistance" supplemental, the Congress was sending a message
to the administration that the "unaccustomed success" the
administration had enjoyed in the year's earlier
supplemental appropriations were to remain just that-
"unaccustomed" . The revitalized House pressed the Senate
for its provisions in conference and exerted direct pressure
on the administration through its inclusion in the bill of a
required report and a time limitation on funds provided for
administration needs. The next supplemental would see even
more fireworks.
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Vn. FY 1991/1992 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION
NUMBER 4: THE "NATURAL DISASTER RELIEF"
SUPPLEMENTAL
The fourth supplemental appropriation passed by Congress
following the enactment of the BEA was Public Law 102-229,
the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers
for Relief From the Effects of Natural Disasters, for Other
Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Costs of "Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm" Act of 1992. Initiated by President
Bush as a FY 1991 supplemental, political debate over this
bill was so extensive that passage did not occur until FY
1992. [Ref 12]
The Natural Disaster Relief Supplemental called for
$13.3 billion in appropriations, of which $12.3 billion was
designated as "emergency" requirements in accordance with
the BEA. [Ref 39] Of the $12.3 billion in emergency funds,
$6.3 billion was to be transferred from previously
appropriated funds and $4.1 billion were to be transferred
from the Defense Cooperation Account or from the Persian
Gulf Regional Defense Fund. Because $6.3 billion was being
transferred from previously appropriated funds, this bill
actually calls for new spending of only $6.9 billion.
[Ref 40]
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Of the $13.3 billion in total spending, $10.5 billion
was defense-related, with $10.4 billion of this being
designated as "emergency" funds. $113 million of the
defense funding was "non-emergency" procurement funding. Of
the $2.8 billion in domestic appropriations, $1.9 billion
was designated as "emergency" funding and $898 million as
"non-emergency". [Ref 39]
The $898 million in "non-emergency" domestic funding was
comprised of $143 million funding for the Federal Emergency
Management Authority, and $755 million for the Commodity
Credit Corporation. In both cases, Congress stipulated that
these funds could only be spent if the White House requested
them and designated them as "emergency" funding. [Ref 40]
The bill included among its "emergency" allocations,
$945 million to pay for crop losses, $800 million for the
Federal Emergency Management Authority disaster relief
program, and $4 billion in new funding for the Persian Gulf
War. Of these amounts, $400 million was provided to assist
the Soviet Union in dismantling its nuclear arsenal and $100
million to transport humanitarian aid. [Ref 41]
The bill was delayed for several months because of
disputes between House Appropriations Committee Chairman
Jamie Whitten (D-Miss) and the Bush Administration over
specifics about "emergency" designation, crop loss payment
size, abortion and a campaign financing amendment. In the
end, the White House appeared to prevail on most of the
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issues that it contested with Congress. [Ref 41] However,
an analysis of the specifics of the legislation indicates
that the White House compromised much on this measure.
A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
On February 28, 1991, House Appropriations Committee
Chairman Whitten introduced HJ Res 157, intended to make
technical changes and correct enrollment errors in FY 1991
appropriations acts. It was passed by the House in a voice
vote and referred to the Senate Appropriations Committee
later that day. Senator Byrd asked for unanimous consent in
the Senate for the joint resolution but objections were
heard. The bill then remained before the Senate
Appropriations Committee as an apparently useless vehicle
after its substance was enacted as Public Law 102-27, the
"Dire Relief" supplemental. [Ref 12] HJ 157 would become a
significant part of the "Natural Disaster Relief"
supplemental process.
In May, 1991, Office of Management and Budget Director
Darman informed Congress that it would be "highly likely"
that the administration would submit a fourth supplemental
request in FY 1991. [Ref 30] On June 28, 1991, the Bush
administration asked Congress for $693 million to ameliorate
the effects of natural disasters that had occurred in the
United States, as well as "emergency" funding for additional
Persian Gulf War expenses. [Ref 28] This occurred as a
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result of the requirement included by Congress in Public Law
102-55 that a study of unfunded natural disasters in the
United States be conducted by the Office of Management and
Budget. This request would help pay for some or all of the
35 disasters declared by the President after September 30,
1991, and meet some mop-up expenses for disasters that
occurred prior to that date. [Ref 28]
The supplemental appeared to be on the Congressional
"fast track" until July 18, 1991, when a veto threat was
issued by the White House. [Ref 42] On July 10, 1991, the
House Appropriations Committee subcommittee chairmen had
decided that they wanted all of the non-defense money to be
treated as "emergency" spending in much the same manner as
the White House had treated the defense money in its
original request. Further, the chairmen began to add
"emergency" items to the request at a rapid rate. 12
[Ref 43] The markup planned for the full committee on July
18, 1991, was the event that drew the veto threat, as the 13
subcommittees added almost $2 billion in extra "emergency"
spending, in addition to declaring all the funds requested
by the President as "emergency". Upon receipt of the veto
threat, Representative Whitten called off the markup and
12 Among the early additions to the President's request
were funds for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration ($3.3 million), emergency crop loss payments
($1.75 billion), abandoned mine reclamation funds ($10.3
million) and dam repairs ($15 million).
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sought a meeting with President Bush on the measure.
[Ref 42]
Despite a last ditch effort by Senator Byrd to get the
measure completed by September 30, 1991, the end of the
fiscal year, the next action that the Congress took on the
measure was on October 10, 1991, when HR 3543, the "Natural
Disaster Relief" supplemental, was referred to the House
Appropriations Committee. On October 17, 1991, the bill was
reported to the full House. It included a blanket
designation for like treatment of domestic and defense
emergencies. [Ref 12]
During the last week of October, numerous amendments to
HR 3543 were considered, including one proposed by
Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo) that called for
even wider "emergency" application. She proposed including
the Women, Infants and Children program, Head Start,
immunization and other programs to the bill to be funded as
emergencies. This $1.39 billion amendment was passed in the
House on October 29, 1991, by a vote of 243-180. Later that
day, the House passed HR 3543 by a vote of 252-162.
[Ref 44]
On October 31, 1991, the Presiding Officer of the Senate
referred HR 3543 to the Senate Appropriations Committee
under the rules. The Senate ignored the House-passed bill
and, instead, took up HJ Res 157 on November 15, 1991,
stripped it and made their own version of the emergency
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spending bill. [Ref 12] This allowed the Senate to drop
controversial language about campaign reform that risked a
veto. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its
version of the "Natural Disaster Relief" supplemental,
HJ Res 157, by a vote of 26-3 on November 15, 1991.
[Ref 46] The Senate version of HJ Res 157 called for $14.3
billion in "emergency" funding compared to the initial
presidential request of $9.7 billion in "emergency" and $542
million in "non-emergency" funding and House-passed
"emergency" funding of $13.8 billion. [Ref 40]
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported HJ Res 157
to the Senate with amendments that would have given the
President greater discretion over what was to be declared an
"emergency". On November 22, 1991, the Senate passed
HJ Res 157 by a vote of 75-17. [Ref 12] On November 27,
1991, the House approved the Conference report by a vote of
303-114, and later the same day the Senate passed the
resolution by a voice vote. [Ref 47] The President signed
Public Law 102-229, the Natural Disaster Relief Supplemental
Bill on December 12, 1991. [Ref 48]
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENACTMENTS AND REQUESTS
Public Law 102-229 provided $12.3 billion in "emergency"
and $1 billion in "non-emergency" funds. The original
request submitted by the President asked for $10.2 billion
in "emergency" funds and no "non-emergency" funds. [Ref 39]
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Of the $1 billion in "non-emergency" funds appropriated by
Congress, $898 million required later designation by the
President as "emergency" requirements, or no appropriation
would be made. Only the $113 million assigned as "non-
emergency" defense procurement was provided unencumbered.
[Ref 47]
Because the President had the option not to designate
the $898 million as "emergency" funding, and thereby
eliminate it altogether from the process, this funding will
not be included in the calculation of the enacted to
requested funds ratio. Excluding these amounts, the enacted
to requested funds ratio can be calculated to be 1.22.
This 1.22 figure is artificially low, however, because
large portions of the original White House request ($6.5
billion out of $10.2 billion) and the appropriated funds
($6.3 billion out of $12.4 billion) were simply further
funding of the Gulf War as discussed in the chapters on
Public Law 102-28 and Public Law 102-55. If these figures
are taken out of the ratio calculation, then the ratio
attained would be 1.65. This figure more accurately
reflects the ratio of enacted to requested funds that had
not already been specified by the "Operation Desert Storm"
supplemental. In terms of "emergency" appropriations, this
ratio can be calculated to be 1.62.
TABLE 7-1 shows the differences between the President's
request and other versions of the bill: [Refs 39 and 40]
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TABLE 7-1 NATURAL DISASTER RELIEF SUPPLEMENTAL
Budget authority in millions of dollars
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Amounts in parenthesis arc tianslerred from other accounts and require no new budget authority
13.173.0
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As can be seen from TABLE 7-1, a great deal of
negotiation had to be conducted to resolve the differences
between the House and Senate bills in conference. Of the 21
items originally proposed by the House, only eight were
agreed to in amount by the Senate. The Senate's proposal
was less than that of the House-passed version in nine
instances, including six in which the Senate authorized no
spending on an item that the House had funded. In the cases
of four items, the Senate version of the bill called for
more spending than the House version. Further, the Senate
called for spending on six items that the House had not
addressed. The fact that the overall spending called for by
the Senate exceeded that proposed by the House surprised
many analysts who expected the Senate to scale back the
House bill. [Ref 46]
From TABLE 7-1 it can also be seen that the conference
committee reported out a bill that increased the funding of
four items above that of either house's original bill. The
conference report decreased funding below that called for in
both bills in seven instances, 13 including all three
programs covered by the Schroeder Amendment. Of the
13 The funds provided the Federal Emergency Management
Administration and the Commodity Credit Corporation are both
considered to be less than either house passed because
portions of each could be allocated only after Presidential
action. In effect, the President had the ability to entirely
eliminate the non-emergency portions of these two items by
simply not declaring an emergency.
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remaining 17 items considered by either house, the
conference committee reported out the funds to which the
House and Senate had agreed in three cases, agreed with the
Senate figure in 12 cases and agreed with the House in two
instances.
From TABLE 7-1, of the President's eight requested
items, 14 three had funds appropriated in excess of the
request and three had appropriated funding less than the
request. Two of the President's requests were funded at the
requested amount. Seven items not addressed by the
President were funded in the conference report. All
rescissions requested by the President were eliminated by
Congress.
With respect to the President's requests for individual
item funding, Congress appropriated more than the President
requested more than three times as often as it appropriated
less than the requested amount. In terms of dollars
appropriated, Congress provided eight times as much in
funding above the President's requests for individual items
than it withheld in funding for items appropriated below the
President's request. 15
14 The President's emergency and non-emergency requests
for the Federal Emergency Management Administration are being
considered as a single request here.
15 The eight to one ratio excludes "non-emergency"
funding for the Federal Emergency Management Administration
and the Commodity Credit Corporation that the President had
the option of ignoring and thereby causing the funds to lapse.
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C. SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DEBATE
Political debate on HR 3543 and HJ Res 157 was
significantly greater than on any of the three preceding
supplemental appropriation bills. This bill, according to
one observer, "was the price the administration paid to keep
earlier supplementals clean or comparatively clean of
traditional add-ons. There [was] enormous pent-up pressure
to tack items onto the bill." [Ref 9] As a result, the
confrontation between the White House and Congress that some
analysts had predicted as early as June began in July and
lasted through November.
The issue that led to the longest delays in having the
bill signed into law was perhaps the most basic. Congress
and the administration could not agree upon which provisions
were to be considered "emergency" for funding purposes.
Controversy over this fundamental issue kept the bill in
limbo for five months. This is a key concept in determining
whether the BEA increased the President's ability to control
supplemental appropriation spending, and, as will later be
seen, one in which the President's control was limited.
Almost immediately after the President sent his reguest
for supplemental appropriations to fund Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm and the effects of natural disasters and
other urgent needs, the House Appropriations Committee "put
Congress on a collision course with the White House over
emergency spending." [Ref 43] By the end of the week of
65
July 10, 1991, the House Appropriations Committee
subcommittees had taken the $3.7 billion request from the
White House and marked it up to $5.6 billion. 16 Further,
the House Appropriations Committee had eliminated the
requested rescissions and included a blanket designation
that all funds were to be treated as "emergency"
requirements. [Ref 42]
These actions were too much for the White House to
accept, and on July 18, 1991, Chairman Whitten received a
veto threat from the White House via Office of Management
and Budget Director Darman. Chief among the White House
objections was the $1.75 billion that Whitten's
Appropriations Agriculture Subcommittee added to the
supplemental for disaster payments to farmers and ranchers.
Admitting that weather had been adverse during the year,
Darman stated that, "There are many existing programs which
are intended to deal with these localized problems."
[Ref 42]
Some Democratic members of Congress wanted to use the
bill as an opportunity to demonstrate Bush's insensitivity
to the needs of the American public - even if it meant
sending a bill that was sure to be vetoed. Rep Whitten, on
the other hand, preferred to try to work out a compromise
16 These figures do not include the $6.5 billion in
adjustment transfers from the Defense Cooperation Account and
Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund that had already been
specified in Public Law 102-28.
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rather than make a political point. Quoting a House
Appropriations Committee source, a vetoed bill " doesn't
help [Whitten's] farmers under three feet of water in
Mississippi." [Ref 42] The White House remained in
opposition to the House plan despite this House attempt at
compromise, insisting that only the $151 million in Federal
Emergency Management Administration funds and the defense
funds be designated as "emergency". Similarly, the House
refused to back down. [Ref 49]
Unable to reach a compromise with the White House, the
House Appropriations Committee was forced to act on HR 3543
in late October. By this time, however, the members of
Congress who wanted their own piece of the pie were waiting.
The $5.6 billion grew to $5.8 billion, and then to $7.5
billion as the Schroeder amendment and other items were
added. [Ref 45] At $7.5 billion, the House-passed bill was
twice that of the President's reguest.
Whitten recognized that the bill's full emergency
funding clause would cause trouble with the White House but
urged passage despite this fact. Pragmatically, he stated,
"This is not the last chance to correct things in this bill,
because now it goes to the Senate." [Ref 45] Passed on
October 29, 1991, the House bill included the following:
Although the President has designated only portions of
the funds in this bill pertaining to the incremental costs
of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and certain
Federal Emergency Management Administration costs as
"emergency" reguirements , the Congress believes that the
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same or higher priority should be given to helping the
American people recover from natural disasters and other
emergency situations as has been given to foreign aid
"emergency" needs. The Congress therefore designates all
funds in this Act as "emergency requirements" for all
purposes of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985. [Ref 12]
The Senate Appropriations Committee modified the House
language concerning full emergency funding as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this joint
resolution, funds in the joint resolution are available
for obligation only for costs of Desert Shield/Desert
Storm or to the extent and only in the amount designated
by the President, not later than the date of enactment of
this joint resolution, to be emergency funding
requirements within the meaning of part C of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as
amended. [Ref 12]
This wording was intended to prevent the President from
signing the measure, spending the money and then ordering an
across-the-board cut in domestic programs to pay for it. It
also gave the President the power to selectively designate
items as "emergency" requirements, and let the others expire
for lack of funds. Such power led some senators, such as
Senator Brock Adams (D-Wash) to cry "line-item veto" yet
again, only this time with more legitimacy. Byrd responded
that he did not expect the bill to go to the White House in
its current form. "I am hopeful that additional amounts for
FEMA and crop losses will be declared an emergency by the
White House," he said. [Ref 46]
Passed by the Senate, HJ Res 157 was taken to conference
with the House. It was here that the administration exerted
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its greatest pressure on the bill. The general provision
wording reverted to the House form and the item-by- item
contingency language of the Senate version was deleted—both
apparent losses for the White House. However, the White
House extracted a compromise from Congress that allowed it
the choice of funding particular expenditures to a level of
the President's choosing.
Specifically, he could transfer "up to" $100 million
from the defense category to transport international
assistance to the Soviet Union, withhold $143 million of the
funding for the Federal Emergency Management Administration
by withholding his "emergency" designation and similarly
withhold $755 million of the Commodity Credit Corporation
funding by not declaring the funds "emergency". [Ref 48]
In a related compromise, the White House extracted a
concession from Congress on the Federal Emergency Management
Administration that required at least $320 million per year
be budgeted for domestic disasters. The Office of
Management and Budget felt that Congress had been
intentionally underfunding the Federal Emergency Management
Administration and relying on "emergency" supplementals to
"expand the budget". [Ref 47] In return, the Congress
included language stating that in the future all of the
amounts appropriated under the Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act above an historical average
or the President's budget request would be considered
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emergency requirements, even without Presidential
designation. [Ref 12]
This final point is significant in that it appears to
have mitigated the President's authority under the BEA to
control supplemental appropriation spending by withholding
his "emergency" designation. In future supplemental
appropriation bills, amounts above the President's request
or the historical average would automatically be funded
outside of the spending caps established by the BEA.
The second most significant issue affecting the
political debate on this supplemental appropriation bill is
closely linked to the first. While debating which items
were to be designated as "emergency" funding requirements,
the Congress was also debating the overall size of the bill.
Because Congress was demanding blanket emergency
designation, and the BEA exempted "emergency" items from the
budget cap limits, the bill's size directly affected the
amount of total government spending for the year.
As previously discussed, the House took the President's
modest request and immediately began adding to it. In its
initial request, the White House offered to designate the
military funding as well as $151 million of its request for
the Federal Emergency Management Administration as
"emergency" funds. [Ref 49] As the bill grew, and Congress
remained firm in its commitment to fund the entire bill as
"emergency" requirements, the White House and its supporters
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in Congress grew stronger in opposition to the bill. In
early September, in an effort to reduce the size of the
bill, the ranking Republican on the House Appropriations
Committee, Joseph McDade (R-Penn) sought to offset $1.2-1.4
billion of the $2.6 billion in non-defense spending. This
effort was ignored as the House Appropriations Committee
moved to mark up the bill. [Ref 49]
In other attempts to limit the size of the bill, aides
in both the House and the Senate suggested stripping some of
the components out of the supplemental and including them on
the regular FY 1992 appropriations bills. [Ref 50] Senator
Byrd suggested that the House Appropriations Committee
should accept a compromise and take advantage of some FY
1991 offsets that were about to expire. [Ref 44] Like
McDade ' s suggestions, these ideas received little attention.
A final attempt was made by McDade to offset some of the
spending on October 29, 1991, as the bill was being
considered by the full House. In a motion to send the bill
back to committee, he included a proposal that offsets be
included in the bill. The feeling in Congress, however, was
not for "legitimizing" the bill by taking money from regular
spending bills, and McDade ' s proposal was defeated 180-232.
[Ref 45]
In its original form, the House bill's size drew
strongest opposition from the White House for its spending
in the area of crop loss payments. The White House wanted
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significantly less than the $1.75 billion called for in the
House bill. [Ref 42] Whitten remained confident throughout
the proceedings that the broad support among both farm state
Republicans as well as Democrats would force the White House
to accept the provision. In conference, where the White
House was a key player, $995 million was made available
without further White House action, and the remaining $755
million included a provision for $100 million for certain
crops planted in 1991 for harvest in 1992 - "a provision
added at the behest of Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole
(R-Kan) , for winter wheat." [Ref 47]
Whitten remained confident that the full amount would
eventually be added to the original administration reguest.
Asked if he thought the Dole provision would help his
crusade to get the full $1.75 billion designated as
"emergency" spending, he replied, "I don't imagine it
hurts." [Ref 47]
Given the initial White House objections to the bill,
the addition of the Schroeder amendment only caused greater
White House concern. Despite support in both houses of
Congress, the Schroeder amendment and its $1.39 billion
price tag were scuttled in conference and did not appear in
the final bill. [Ref 48] Provoking cries of foul by
Representative Schroeder, this was the White House's single
greatest victory in paring back congressional add-ons.
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Indeed, the final bill was much larger than the White
House would have liked, but there were only a limited number
of alternatives available to the White House. The language
of the bill sharply limited the President's ability to
withhold emergency designation as he had threatened in the
"Dire Emergency" and other supplemental . And as
Representative Vin Weber (R-Minn) stated, "[the] average
person thinks that [disaster relief] is what the government
ought to be doing." Further, he commented that it would be
difficult to argue that the bill was "busting the budget"
when the FY 1992 deficit was already projected to be $350
billion. [Ref 45]
Two other aspects of the bill, neither of which involved
appropriations, also drew considerable political debate.
These were an amendment concerning campaign finance reform
and a provision prohibiting arms sales to Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait until their financial contributions to the Desert
Shield/Desert Storm operation were fulfilled. [Ref 45]
The campaign finance reform amendment would have changed
the way in which presidential candidates could get financing
from the taxpayer checkoff fund. This had been passed by
the House but was deleted by the Senate Appropriations
Committee. Senator Byrd feared that the inclusion of the
provision would open the way for other tax amendments and
provoke "a sure filibuster" on the Senate floor. [Ref 46]
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The White House strongly opposed the amendment, calling
it "election eve politics" that would change long standing
rules. The campaign reform language was perhaps the single
item most likely to result in a veto and was deleted from
the bill in conference. [Ref 46]
As previously discussed, Senator Byrd had for some time
been expressing frustration over the slow remittance of Gulf
War pledges from the allies. This finally manifested itself
in a statute with teeth when he had a reguirement included
in the conference report that stated:
No funds appropriated or otherwise made available by
this or any other Act may be used in any fiscal year to
conduct, support, or administer any sale of defense
articles or defense services to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait
until that country has paid in full.... the following
commitments made to the United States to support Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm:
(1) In the case of Saudi Arabia, $16,839,000,000
(2) In the case of Kuwait, $16 , 006 , 000 , 000 . . .
.
[Ref 48]
Congressional Quarterly summarized the action on this
supplemental appropriation bill as follows:
The House vote was a long time coming. The White House
began the process June 28 with a reguest for money for the
Pentagon and disaster-battered communities. House
Appropriations subcommittees marked up a bill the week of
July 8, but the money they added for farmers and others
triggered an administration veto threat, which threw the
measure into limbo for months while appropriators vainly
sought a compromise with the administration.
By contrast, the twin supplemental spending bills
reguested by the White House in early February (HR 1281, HR
1282) were cleared by the end of March. This supplemental
was on hold for so long that it had to be changed from a
fiscal 1991 to a fiscal 1992 measure. Appropriators finally
decided not to let the veto threat stall the measure any
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longer, and the result was a bill nearly twice as large as
the original White House request. [Ref 45]
The Federal Budget Report concludes
The White House appears to have prevailed on most. . .
.
issues. Crop payments, which were expected to total $1.75
billion, were reduced to less than $ 1 billion in the bill.
However, a provision states that another $755 million will
be made available if the president submits an emergency
funding request. The campaign financing amendment was
struck from the bill entirely .... Finally , the $800 million
in FEMA funding contains a contingency clause that allows
another $143 million to be appropriated if the president
requests it. [Ref 41]
Despite the White House successes, "emergency" funding
in the final "Natural Disaster Relief" supplemental
appropriation bill was significantly greater than requested.
Further, the compromise reached on funding for the Federal
Emergency Management Administration had the potential to
mitigate the power of the President to control supplemental
appropriation spending by eliminating his ability to
withhold "emergency" designation for appropriations that




A. IMPACT OF THE BEA
An analysis of the first supplemental appropriation
bills enacted in the year following the passage of the BEA
indicates that the White House was initially able to use the
BEA with some success to limit congressional freedom in
supplemental appropriation spending. The Administration's
aim was to reduce the number of congressional add-ons to the
President's reguests for supplemental appropriations.
However, as each supplemental appropriation bill was
initiated by the White House, the spending control exercised
under the BEA diminished.
Beginning with the "Dire Emergency" supplemental, three
of the first four supplemental appropriation bills enacted
following the passage of the BEA clearly demonstrated a
trend. This pattern saw Congress appropriate even larger
amounts above the President's reguests than it had
appropriated in the previous decade before the BEA took
effect.
This is clearly evidenced by the increase in the ratios
of enacted to reguested funds calculated for post-BEA bills
as compared to the 1981-1989 baseline. The 1981-1989
enacted to reguested funds ratio averaged 1.02. The "Dire
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Emergency" supplemental had a 1.47 ratio, the "Operation
Desert Storm" supplemental a 1.0 ratio, the "Humanitarian
Assistance" supplemental a 1.21 ratio and the "Natural
Disaster Relief" supplemental had a 1.65 ratio. TABLE 8-1








"Dire Emergency" Supplemental 1.47
"Operation Desert Storm" Supplemental 1.00
"Humanitarian Assistance" Supplemental 1.21
"Natural Disaster Relief" Supplemental 1.65
The only supplemental appropriation bill that was below
the historic average was the "Operation Desert Storm" bill,
which, as noted in Chapter 5, was kept artificially clean.
Would-be Congressional add-ons were lumped on to the "Dire
Emergency" supplemental to avoid the charge that Congress
was using a required war funding bill as a vehicle for non-
essential projects.
More importantly, when only the "emergency" funding
within the bills is analyzed, the ratios paint much the same
picture. It is, after all, only within this portion of the
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post-BEA supplemental appropriation legislation that the
President was given new authority to control spending. If
this new authority made a difference, it should be most
apparent here.
Analyzing only "emergency" spending, the "Dire
Emergency" supplemental ratio drops from 1.47 to 1.1 and the
"Natural Disaster Relief" supplemental drops to 1.62 from
1.65. The ratios for the other two bills remain the same
because they were fully funded as "emergency" requirements.




ENACTED TO REQUESTED FUNDS RATIOS:
EMERGENCY PORTION OF 19 91 SUPPLEMENTALS
(total budget authority)
Bill Ratio
"Dire Emergency" Supplemental 1.10
"Operation Desert Storm" Supplemental 1.00
"Humanitarian Assistance" Supplemental 1.21
"Natural Disaster Relief" Supplemental 1.62
The fact that the White House did not use its new powers
as defined by the BEA to restrict "emergency" spending is
reflected in these figures. As previously discussed, the
Administration was able to prevent additional "emergency"
spending on small items only. On most highly visible,
expensive items, Congress was able to obtain concessions
from the White House, resulting in significantly higher
"emergency" spending than initially proposed by the White
House. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that neither
Congress nor the President were willing to alienate the
large segments of voters that would have been affected by
deletion of expensive programs, whereas the parochial nature
of most small programs did not dissuade the President from
exercising his new powers.
Similarly, when individual items within the bills are
compared to the baseline period, the BEA does not appear to
have had any impact. From 1981-1989, about half of the
items either requested by the President or funded by
Congress were funded at the amount requested by the
President. Of the 75 individual items either requested by
the President or funded by Congress in the three non-
"Operation Desert Storm" supplementals enacted after the
passage of the BEA, only 23, or 31 percent, received
appropriated funds equalling the President's request. When
not appropriated at the requested amount, the percentage of
items funded above the amount requested by the President
rose from 60 percent in the baseline period to 80 percent
under the BEA. This indicates an increase in the
probability that Congress will fund individual items in
supplemental appropriations above the levels requested by
the President.
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Similarly, after the passage of the BEA, Congress was
likely to add more total funding to those items that were
appropriated above the President's reguest than it was to
reduce the total funding for items appropriated below the
President's reguest. In fact, by the time that the Natural
Disaster Relief supplemental was passed, Congress
appropriated eight times as much funding above the
President's individual item reguests than it withheld in
funding from those items appropriated below the reguests.
This was a dramatic increase from the three to one ratio in
the 1981-1989 period.
Judged solely on these analytical ratios and
mathematical calculations, the BEA would have to be
considered unsuccessful in controlling supplemental
appropriation spending. The rising ratios of enacted to
reguested funds, coupled with the rising percentage of
"emergency" funding within the bills, clearly demonstrate a
deteriorating control of supplemental appropriation
spending.
This result surprised many analysts who, upon passage of
the BEA thought that congressional add-ons to supplemental
appropriation bills would be greatly curtailed by the new
powers afforded the executive branch by the BEA. Rudolf G.
Penner stated, "the new process [BEA] has greatly enhanced
the executive branch's power in the budget process. In
bargaining over emergency legislation, the president's power
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bears some resemblance to having an item veto." [Ref 51]
from statements such as this it can be inferred that this
new power, or the threat of its use, would significantly
reduce the volume of congressional add-ons attached to
supplemental appropriation bills.
While some members of Congress attempted to limit the
growth of supplemental appropriations by offsetting their
costs, the trend was to fund ever larger portions of the
bills as "emergency" reguirements . The amount of
"emergency" appropriations as a percentage of total
appropriations went from about 32 percent in the "Dire
Emergency" supplemental to about 98 percent in the "Natural
Disaster Relief" supplemental. 17
This trend towards full "emergency" funding can be seen
in another calculation as well. In the "Natural Disaster
Relief" supplemental, the enacted to reguested funds ratio
for the bill total was 1.65 to one. For the "emergency"
items in the bill alone, the ratio was 1.62 to one. As none
of the "non-emergency" funds appropriated by the bill were
requested by the President, the similarity between these two
17 The percentage calculated for the "Natural Disaster
Relief" supplemental excludes those funds not appropriated to
the Federal Emergency Management Administration and the
Commodity Credit Corporation without further presidential
action and all "adjustments" for Desert Storm funding. If the
Federal Emergency Management Administration and Commodity
Credit Corporation funds were included in the calculation as
"non-emergency" funds, the percentage of "emergency" funding
within the bill would be 83 percent. If included as
"emergency" funding, the percentage would rise to 99 percent.
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values indicates the small contribution of "non-emergency"
funds to the bill's total.
The movement towards expanding the "emergency" portion
of funds in the supplemental appropriation bills passed
subseguent to the BEA indicates that the President was
unable or unwilling to use his new authority under this
statute to limit congressional increases to his proposals
for supplemental appropriation spending. Congress and the
President appear to be willing to collaborate in the use of
"emergency" designation to increase supplemental
appropriation funding outside of the BEA caps. Senator Pete
Domenici (R-NM) anticipated this problem:
I submit that there is no budget agreement left, because
Congress can decide every time they want something new;
that they will send it to the President and say, we think
it is an emergency, if you agree, there is no budget
limitation. . .
.
I believe you have every opportunity to ignore the
budget resolution, the appropriation caps, and send him
[the President] freestanding spending bills, and put the
emergency in his lap and say, if you declare it, we spend
it, if you do not, it is not an emergency. And that
becomes the end of the budget resolution and the 5-year
agreement. [Ref 12]
The "Dire Emergency" and "Humanitarian Assistance"
supplementals further demonstrate the apparent willingness
of the Congress and the White House to circumvent the spirit
of the spending restrictions of the BEA. In the case of the
"Dire Emergency" supplemental bill, $655 million in veterans
benefits were classified as "emergency" funds, to be
transferred from the Defense Cooperation Account.
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Similarly, and perhaps more dramatically, in the
"Humanitarian Assistance" supplemental, Congress and the
White House stretched the "emergency" Desert Shield costs
exception of the BEA to include international assistance
funds. In both cases, "creative" financing was used to
extract more funding than would have been otherwise
available under the statutory language of the BEA.
As Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill) indicated,
such efforts to "overwork" the "emergency" authority of the
BEA bodes badly for future supplemental appropriation
spending control. [Ref 12]
If one is to try to predict the future effectiveness of
the BEA in controlling supplemental appropriation spending,
it is not enough to look at the four bills examined in this
analysis on solely dollar terms. An analysis of the
political dynamics of supplemental appropriation legislation
following the passage of the BEA gives further clues to the
probable future effectiveness of the BEA in enhancing
supplemental appropriation spending control.
The White House enjoyed "unaccustomed success" in
controlling congressional add-ons in the "Dire Emergency"
and "Operation Desert Storm" supplementals. This
"unaccustomed success", however, did not translate into
significant results. The Administration got its way mainly
on small price-tag items, while Congress prevailed on most
big-dollar items. And the Administration's effectiveness
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eroded with each bill. By the time that Congress and the
Administration took up the "Natural Disaster Relief"
supplemental, little White House success was evident.
This erosion in the ability of the White House to limit
the amount of spending added by Congress to supplemental
appropriation bills is attributable to a single cause. It
is linked to the circumstances under which the BEA was
passed late in 1990, at the very end of the 101st Congress.
At the time that it was brought to the floor, many
congressmen had just received their copies of the
legislation and had not yet had an opportunity to review it
closely. The Congressional leaders who had negotiated the
agreement with the White House pressed for passage of the
Act before the winter recess despite the concerns raised by
many in Congress that they did not know the specifics on
what they were voting. When signed into law on November 5,
1990, many members of Congress did not understand the new
law.
As the supplemental appropriation bills of 1991
unfolded, many members of Congress came to appreciate, and
then object to, the new authority granted to the executive
branch in this area of the law. In the early bills,
Congress appeared uncertain as to how to counter the new
White House clout. The White House effectively singled out
items Congress wanted to include in the "emergency" portion
of these bills and communicated its intention to withhold
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its designation of these items as "emergency" needs. The
Congress apparently had no option other than to back down or
accept the mini-sequester threat.
However, by the time that the "Natural Disaster Relief"
supplemental was being debated, Congress had discovered a
strategy to prevent the President from using this power in
future domestic natural disaster cases. This new
congressional strategy mitigated the President's "line-item
veto"
.
According to this strategy, the President would have no
choice other than to veto a supplemental appropriation bill
in its entirety in order to eliminate any undesired
"emergency" Stafford disaster funds. Specifically, Congress
included a requirement that in the future, all funds
appropriated under the Stafford disaster relief category
that were in excess of the amount requested by the President
in his budget request or the historical average would be
considered as "emergency" without any further action.
Because these "emergency" funds no longer required his
designation to be treated as such, if the President wanted
funding for his requested programs, he would be forced to
accept funding for these disasters as "emergency" as well.
Without the threat of a mini-sequester for these domestic
natural disaster programs that push spending above the
limits of the caps, spending control in supplemental
appropriations may be lost.
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The circumstances surrounding the "Dire Emergency" and
"Operation Desert Storm" supplemental appropriation bills
were unique and are unlikely to be repeated in the future.
Future supplemental appropriation bills should not be
expected to demonstrate this kind of self-imposed exercise
in congressional spending control. In fact, the loss of
this control was already evident in the "Natural Disaster
Relief" supplemental bill.
As if to add insult to the injury manifest in the
diminution of the President's control over supplemental
appropriations, Congress included wording in the "Natural
Disaster Relief" supplemental that allowed the President to
increase, but not lower, the "emergency" spending
appropriated by Congress. Congress made $898 million in
funding contingent upon request and designation as
"emergency" by the President. Deprived of his future
ability to control supplemental appropriation spending in
domestic natural disasters, the President could only ask
Congress to spend more than they had appropriated, and only
funds that were outside of the spending limits imposed by
the BEA.
With the passage of the BEA, there was an expectation
among analysts that supplemental appropriation spending
would be subject to increased spending control. This
control would result from the President's ability to
withhold "emergency" designation from various programs
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supported by Congress, bolstered by the threat of a mini-
sequester to reduce spending to the levels of the BEA caps.
Some observers of the budget process had been encouraged by
the passage of the BEA to expect that the President would be
better positioned to limit congressional increases to
supplemental appropriation requests. As time passed,
however, it became more apparent that the controls enacted
by the BEA were not going to be effectively exercised by the
White House.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Analysis of the first four supplemental appropriation
bills enacted following the passage of the BEA yields
several implications for future Department of Defense
supplemental appropriation legislation. The Department of
Defense received strong support from Congress and the
Administration in each bill. However, certain actions by
Congress highlighted the fact that Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm provided a unique set of circumstances
from which the Department of Defense benefitted, but which
may not be present in the future. Notwithstanding the fact
that these special circumstances existed at the time the
supplemental appropriation bills were passed, Congress did
not agree to all of the Administration's requests for
Department of Defense funding.
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Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm presented a special
case for recent supplemental appropriation legislation.
Funding for the war, embodied in the supplementals , was
exempt from the BEA caps by virtue of the statutory language
of the BEA. Both Congress and the Administration had
incentives to keep the Department of Defense aspects of the
bills clean. As a high-profile, statutorily defined
emergency, the Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm portions
of these supplemental appropriations bills received special
treatment from lawmakers and the executive branch. It is
not likely that future Department of Defense supplemental
appropriation reguests will enjoy such a privileged status.
Despite this privileged status and the overwhelming
public support for the Persian Gulf War with its conseguent
pressure on Congress to support the war, Congress
demonstrated in the "Operation Desert Storm" supplemental
that it would continue to exercise close scrutiny of the
Department of Defense's reguests. This scrutiny resulted in
a reduction of the initial Department of Defense reguest.
These cuts occurred despite the fact that congressional
leaders had agreed to facilitate the bill's passage.
Given the unigue support that Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm enjoyed, and the fact that such
congressional support for the Department of Defense is not
routine, it is guite likely that future Department of
Defense supplemental appropriation reguests will endure
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greater scrutiny and be subject to stricter limits than
those imposed on the "Operation Desert Storm" supplemental
appropriation bill.
Other examples indicating that the BEA was not going to
fundamentally alter the nature of the relationship between
the Department of Defense and Congress were evident in the
"Humanitarian Assistance" supplemental appropriation bill.
In this supplemental, Congress balked at providing open-
ended funding for the military component of the relief
effort. Representative Murtha ' s comments that "the
Comptroller knows that we're not going to leave this thing
open ended," in reference to the Administration's reguest
for unlimited authority to pay for the military component of
relief, was evidence that Congress was going to maintain its
longstanding policy of providing limited funding for
Department of Defense activities.
This policy had been previously demonstrated in the
"Dire Emergency" and "Operation Desert Storm" supplemental
appropriation bills. The fact that Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm were still being appropriated as late as the
"Natural Disaster Relief" supplemental appropriation bill is
indicative of the fact that even in a case where Department
of Defense funding enjoyed considerable public support,
Congress kept defense spending on a short leash. With
significant future defense reductions likely, supplemental
appropriation funds for the Department of Defense are
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unlikely to be provided any less judiciously, if such
supplemental appropriations for defense are proposed at all.
A final implication for the Department of Defense
derived from the 1991 supplemental appropriation measures is
implicit in the actions of Senator Byrd. With each bill,
Senator Byrd was quick to point out the inadequacy of the
allied financial contribution effort. At first, the
Senator's complaint was that the total of the pledges seemed
to be inadequate. Later, the rate of payment invoked his
rage. The fact that Senator Byrd was able, time and again,
to muster support within Congress for his position implies
that future military efforts by the United States may
require substantial financial backing from abroad,
especially if other nation's interests are threatened. It
is not unimaginable that Congress might withhold funding for
future Department of Defense operations subject to financial
support by our allies.
In summary, the BEA has not proven to be a watershed
event for the supplemental appropriation legislative
process. Funding for supplemental appropriation bills
continued in much the same manner as in the past. Small
amounts of "non-emergency funds were added to the
supplemental appropriation bills enacted following the
passage of the BEA. Cuts in regular appropriations were
required when these "non-emergency" items were left in the
bill.
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But by and large, most funding added by Congress was not
offset by spending cuts in other appropriations. There were
no mini-sequesters which were the result of excess spending
in supplemental appropriations bills. In short, spending
control was not enhanced by the new authority given to the
executive branch in this area.
Congress eventually vitiated the President's new power
under the BEA by enacting legislation that exempted domestic
natural disasters from the budget caps of the BEA. Funding
of supplemental appropriation bills was no different under
the BEA than it was in the pre-BEA era when budget caps did
not exist and most supplemental appropriation bill funding
added to the government's total expenditures.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Future research should include an analysis of the two
fiscal year 1992 supplemental appropriation bills to
determine whether these trends have continued. These two
bills, Public Laws 102-302 and 102-368, both contained
provisions for domestic discretionary supplemental
appropriations. [Ref 52]
Of additional interest would be an analysis of the BEA's
"emergency" provisions for mandatory spending programs.
While this thesis focused solely on the use of the
"emergency" provisions of the BEA as they affected
discretionary supplemental appropriations, the President has
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similar authority with respect to mandatory or entitlement
programs. It might be expected that, since the BEA has made
little difference in the discretionary supplemental
appropriation process, a similar result would be found in
the area of entitlement spending. The same sort of analysis
that was used in this study could be used to determine
whether the BEA has increased spending control in the
remainder of the federal budget.
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